Abstract. This paper addresses the biometric template security issue. Follow out previous work on class distribution transform, the proposed scheme selects the distinguish points automatically. By considering the geometric relationship with the biometric templates, the proposed scheme transforms a real-value biometric template to a binary string such that the class distribution is preserved and proved mathematically. The binary string is then further encoded using BCH and hashing method to ensure that the template protecting algorithm is non-invertible. Two face databases, namely ORL and FERET, are selected for evaluation and LDA is used for creating the original template. Experimental results show that by integrating the proposed scheme into the LDA (original) algorithm, the system performance can be further improved by 1.1% and 4%, in terms of equal error rate, on ORL and FERET databases respectively. The results show that the proposed scheme not only can preserve the original template discriminant power, but also improve the performance if the original template is not fully optimized.
Introduction
Biometric recognition is a reliable, robust and convenient way for person authentication [1, 2, 4] . With the growing use of biometrics, there is a rising concern about the security and privacy of the biometric template itself. Recent studies have shown that "hill climbing attacks" [5] on a biometric system are able to recover the biometric templates. As a result, templates have to be stored in an encrypted form to protect them. The matching step needs to be performed in encrypted domain because the decrypted templates are insecure. Different biometric template protection algorithms have been proposed in the last few years and can be categorized into two approaches.
The first approach is the cancelable template proposed by Ratha et al. [2] in 2001. The basic idea is that the system only uses a cancelable template, which is transformed by the original template using a one-way function. Therefore, if the cancelable template is lost or stolen, the system may reset and re-issue another cancelable template using different set of parameters of the one-way function. In their recent study on cancelable biometric for fingerprint [3] , the use of distortion function caused the FAR to increase by about 5% for a given FRR. While the invertibility of their transform is low, the discriminability of their cancelable template is not known. No analysis of invertibility vs. discriminability was reported in [3] .
The second approach combined cryptographic methods with the biometric system, known as biometric cryptosystem. This approach consists of two stages [10] . First, the biometric template is transformed into a string. The second step generates a cryptographic key from the string using cryptographic technique. Some methods such as fuzzy commitment scheme [7] and fuzzy vault scheme [8, 9] , have been proposed for the second step. However, direct applying error correcting coding can only handle relatively small intra-class variations. In order to handle a relative large variation such as face template, Ngo et al. [10] proposed a new algorithm for the first step. They employed random projection and other appearance-based dimension reduction methods (PCA, LDA) to further extract the features. After that, a bit string is obtained using a thresholding technique. However, it is not clear whether the algorithm preserves the original template discriminability. Along this line, Feng and Yuen [11] proposed a new conceptual model called Class Distribution Preserving (CDP) Transform. A new scheme was proposed using a set of "distinguish point" and distance measurement. The "distinguish point" set is randomly generated, which will increase the randomness of the representation. A tri-state representation is proposed to overcome the distortion in transform, but the tri-state bit is hard to estimate.
In this paper, based on the concept of CDP transform, a new scheme is proposed to transform a real value biometric template into a bit string. In the proposed scheme, the set of "distinguish point" will be selected and the estimation of the tri-state bit is not required. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will give a review on the class distribution preserving transform. Section 3 will present our new proposed scheme while the experimental results will be reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 will give the conclusion.
Class Distribution Preserving Transform
The basic idea of class distribution preserving (CDP) transform [11] can be illustrated using Fig. 1 . Consider a two class problem with class Ω 1 (data represented by "cross") and Ω 2 (data point represented by "circle"). Given distinguish points say B 1 and B 2 , for any real value feature vector (biometric template) V in ddimensional space, it can be transformed into a k-dimensional (k = 2 in this case) tri-state bit string [b 1 , b 2 ], where Although the scheme in [11] works, there are rooms for improvement. First, all distinguish points are randomly generated and therefore, may not be able to generate a set of optimal bit string. Second, the number of distinguish points depends on the number of class which may introduce a complexity burden when the class number is large. Finally, it is hard to estimate the parameter "r" in calculating the tri-state φ.
Our Proposed Scheme
The block diagram of the proposed system is shown in Fig. 2 . It consists of enrollment and authentication phases. The template protection algorithm consists of three blocks, namely class distribution preserving transform, error correction coding and hashing. The error correction coding and hashing steps are used to ensure that the protecting algorithm is non-invertible. This paper mainly focuses on the class distribution preserving transform.
The proposed scheme follows the concept of class distribution preserving (CDP) transform [11] , but removes the limitations in our previous work [11] . This paper makes two major changes. First, instead of follow the scheme in [11] for biometric identification system (one to many), the new scheme is designed for authentication system (one to one). In practice, most of the biometric systems perform authentication, such as border control in Hong Kong and China. Second, the distinguish point set is determined so as to preserve the class distribution after transformation. Details of our scheme are discussed as follows.
CDP Transform for Authentication System
Assume there are c classes
For each class Ω o , let r o be the largest distance any two data points in Ω o , For authentication system, we only need to solve a two-class problem. Therefore, in determining the distinguish point set for class Ω o , we only need to consider the class Ω o , and
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So the problem is defined as follows. Given a data point (biometric template) V , we would like to find a transformation T which has the following two CDP properties, where d 1 and d 2 are distance functions in input and transformed space respectively and t o is the threshold in the transformed domain.
This property shows that if V belongs to class Ω o , after transformation, V also belongs to the same class.
This property shows that if V does not belong to class Ω o , after transformation, V will also not belong to the class Ω o .
Determining Distinguish Points and Thresholds
In order to develop the CDP transformation for authentication system as discussed in Section 3.1, we need to determine the set of k distinguish points Let the data points (biometric templates) in each class are represented as
Each template will be transformed into a k-dimensional binary string. The proposed method consists of two steps. The first step finds the k directions where the distinguish points to be located while the positions as well as the threshold values will be determined in the second step.
Step
. . k).
The output of this step will be k clusters
Step 2. This step determines the exact positions of distinguish points in each direction (unit vector). The position of the i-th distinguish point along the direction of v i can be written as 
The parameter d here is the largest value of |P j M o |, (j = 1, 2 . . . m) and e i (i = 1, 2 . . . k) here is random generated value between range [0, 2]. The rationale in determining the a i will be discussed in next section.
Proof of the CDP Properties
Before discussing the proof, let's consider two scenarios in which a distinguish point is located in two positions with respect to a data point outside the class Ω o as shown in Fig. 2. Scenario One. Considering a distinguish point {B i , th i } where B i and P j are located in the opposite direction with respect to Ω o with center M o as Fig. 3 . In this case, th i = |B i M o | + r o . For any data point P j in group G i (after clustering in step 1) and
The distance between the distinguish point B i and P j , Q s , M o can be written as 
and
The distance between the distinguish point B i and P j , Q s , M o can be written as
That means
So, using B i as a distinguish point, the point P j , Q s and M o are then transformed into bit
That means, data points within the class Ω o will be transformed into same bit value while data points outside the class Ω o will be transformed into opposite value.
So far, we have shown that under the above two scenarios, the transformed bit of any feature vector Q in class Ω o will be the same with M o , and the transformed bit of any feature vector V in group G i will be different from M o . Using the same argument as above, consider all k pairs {B 1 , th 1 }, {B 2 , th 2 } . . . {B k , th k }, the transformed bit string of any feature vector Q in class Ω o will be the same with M o . And there is at least one bit in the transformed bit string of any feature vector V out of class Ω o which is different from M o . (Because V should belong to one group G i and the corresponding pair {B i , th i } will contribute a different bit from M o .) Therefore, we can prove that
The function d 2 can be Hamming distance between two bit strings. One important thing on cos θ j we would like to point out. In scenarios 1 and 2, cos θ j needs to satisfy the following two conditions
And hence,
Because P j is out of class Ω o , i.e.,
To satisfy the requirement
The parameter e i is used to increase the randomness of the generated pairs of distinguish points and thresholds because they do contain some information of the class Ω o .
Experiment Results
Two experiments on ORL and FERET face databases are performed to evaluate our proposed scheme. The ORL database consists of 40 individuals, 10 images per individual while FERET database consists of 250 individuals, 4 images per individual. The experiments are conducted based on the block diagram in Fig. 2 in which the Fisherface [12] algorithm (feature extractor) is used to construct the original template while the matching is performed in hashed domain to ensure that the template protection algorithm is non-invertible.
Since the database size is relatively small, leave-one-out method is employed to conduct the experiments. The average error/accuracy is recorded. The results are plotted in Fig. 4 and 5 with different number of distinguish points (k). Fig. 4 and 5 show the ROC curves (with label "CDP") on ORL and FERET databases respectively. It can be shown that the performance increases when the number of distinguish points increase. The performance of the Fisherface algorithm with nearest neighbor classifier are also recorded and plotted in Fig. 4 and 5 (label as "original"). It can be shown that the proposed scheme outperforms original Fisherface algorithm while the biometric template is protected. To compare with the existing algorithm, the bio-hashing scheme proposed by Ngo et al. [10] is selected because this algorithm also follows the biometric hardening approach. Same experiments setting are used for bio-hashing algorithm and the results are plotted in Fig. 4 and 5 with label "bioh". Parameter r here means the variation σ related to transform of φ in the bio-hashing algorithm. It can be seen that our proposed outperforms bio-hashing algorithm as well.
The equal error rates (ERR) of each curve are recorded and tabulated in Tab. 1 and 2. Comparing with the original template, the proposed method improves the performance at 1.1% and 4% on ORL and FERET databases respectively, while it is about 4.6% and 1.3% in comparing with the bio-hashing scheme. 
Conclusions
A new scheme for the class preserving transform has been developed and reported in this paper. The scheme is designed for the authentication system and determines the distinguish point set automatically so that after transformation, the inter-class and intra-class data distribution are preserved. Two face databases, namely ORL and FERET, are selected for evaluation and LDA is used for creating the original template. Two face databases, namely ORL and FERET, are selected for evaluation and LDA is used for creating the original template. Experimental results show that by integrating the proposed scheme into the LDA (original) algorithm, the system performance can be further improved by 1.1% and 4%, in terms of equal error rate, on ORL and FERET databases respectively.
The results show that the proposed scheme not only can preserve the original template discriminant power, but also improve the performance if the original template is not fully optimized.
